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Harmonizing the Policy of the Bankruptcy code and Article 9
Edwin E. Smith

Elizabeth Warren

James J. White

In a true sens e bankr uptcy l aw--at least as represent ed by
the 1978 Code--is in conflic t , not in harmony , with Article 9. To
a considerable degree (perhaps more than they r eal i ze) debtors
and unsecured c redi tors got things they wanted from congr ess by
the adoption of t he Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. It is d oubtful
that that Act c ou ld have been passed i n any Congr ess before or
since .

In many ways, the rights of t he debtor and of the

unsecured c reditors have been cut back since the adoption of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act .
Consider the points of dispute discussed below and some o f
t he things that might be done about them .
1.

Virtually all of the lit i gati on on the question whether

a security i nterest has been perfected a r ise s in the ba nkruptcy
c ourt . The r e one sees bankruptcy judges dealing wi th the question
whether name changes, the omission of a name, or some other
defect in the place of filing or in the document that wa s filed
renders a secured creditor unperfected.

Most of that lit igation

would go away if 9-301{1) (b) wer e repealed .

That secti on reads

as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) , an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the r i ghts
of • - • • (b) a person who becomes a l ien creditor be f ore the
securit y interest is perfected( . ]
I f s ection 9-3 01(1) (b) were repealed, an unperfected securit y
int e rest would defeat a lien creditor u nder state law. Since the
trustee in bankruptcy has the r i ghts of a lien creditor--and
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normally no greater rights--against a personal property secured
creditor, the trustee's claims under 544(a) would be subordinated
to the unperfected secured creditor's claim and he would lose to
the secured creditor even in circumstances where the secured
creditor had failed to file a financing statement.
Why have not the secured creditors proposed the abolition of
9-301(1) (b) or, a smaller step, the addition of a term to Article
9 to the effect that any good faith attempt at filing renders the
secured creditor perfected at least against a lien creditor?

One

might argue for this outcome in bankruptcy on the theory that the
trustee represents basically unsecured creditors, most of whom
will never have been injured by or relied upon an absence of
filing by a secured creditor. See, James J. White, "Revising
Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation," 26 Loy. L.A.L.Rev. 823
(1993).

2.

A second grand area of conflict between

ban~ruptcy

and

Article 9 arises in attacks on secured lenders who finance LBOs.
In a number of cases the creditors' argument that they give
reasonable equivalent value by lending money has fallen on deaf
ears.

Collapsing these transactions, courts have been willing to

say the secured creditor's loan goes into the hands and pockets
of the shareholders of the target company (even though the money
is not lent directly to them) whereas the value comes out of the
pocket of the target company itself.

Thus the value is given to

one and the transfer comes from another.

This outcome, of

course, makes the secured creditors into the policemen of the LBO
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trade. But where do the courts get the power to disregard the
form of the transactions?

Should t he Bankruptcy Code or , more

likely the state fraudulent c onveyance law, be modified to
r e cognize that the secure d creditor gives new val ue a nd is not
t herefore subject t o upset by a fraudulent conveyance argument?

3.

The most pervas i ve point of tension between secured

. creditors on the one hand and bankruptcy on the other arises from
the stay , from the terms of section 1129 and from other sections
in Chapter 11 that allow the debtor in possession to disregard
the supposed superiority and full protection that the Bankruptcy
Code gives to the secured creditor.
What could and should be done with the Code here?
shortening of the exclusivity period be sensible?

Would a

What about the

possibil i ty of the Code's adopting the losing proposition in
Timbers, namely, that adequate protection always includes the
requirement of paying current lost opportunity costs to a secured
creditor who will not receive its collateral at once?

Are the

secured creditors going to argue for such changes before the
Commission and the Congress?
go for?

What other suggestions should they

